3 be that zero tolerance is always a bad prescription in this arena, but that naming and shaming is often a necessary part of an effective criminal policy.
I spent a decade as a Part-time Commissioner with the Trade Practices Commission betweem 1985 and 1995. During each of those years we would receive around 50,000 complaints. Many of them did not involve breaches of the law, but in my opinion the majority did (obviously an opinion I cannot prove). In a good year we would take about 30 of them to court. Most business regulatory scholars see the Australian Trade Practices Commission as a comparatively tough agency, with a sophisticated enforcement strategy that makes the business community sit up and take notice. We might refer to Amanda Vanstone as the Minister for not arresting Christopher Skase, but we do not speak of Allan Fels in those terms.
A lot of the effectiveness of the TPC then and the ACCC today is about the sophistication of its triage: 1) This one is an allegation we can help the complainant sort out with a bit of advice as to what they should say to the trader. Or it is an allegation we can sort out ourselves with a couple of phone-calls or a conference with the principals to negotiate an informal settlement. 2) Another complaint is viewed as spurious or a hard allegation to prove and impossible to settle; the complainants are advised "no action"; they are welcome to take a private action. 3) This is one of the 30 we should take to court.
The key is to select those 30 cases so that they send out the widest possible ripples. The main significance of the cases the Commission had the resources to litigate was not what they achieved in those 30 cases, but in the clout they deliver to the regulator to settle thousands of other matters on the strength of a single phone-call. Australian consumers in the long run get better protection from a regulator that vigorously litigates a modest number of strategic cases than from one that pretends to be doing something about every breach of the law that arrives in its mailbag.
Yet whenever I would argue with my colleagues on the Commission that we should be completely honest with the Australian people that this was our enforcement strategy, they 4 would resist going far down this track. They did not want Ministers complaining that the Commission was failing to prosecute large numbers of traders who had committed clear breaches of the criminal law. We were all sophisticated enough to understand that it never could be otherwise, but we could not count on the tabloid press to so view it.
I will not labour here the conclusion that zero tolerance is an irresponsible policy for the ACCC or any other business regulatory agency because Ian Ayres and I have done that job in Responsive Regulation (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) . It is hardly necessary in a world where we are regularly plied with stories that "5 per cent of all trading on the Australian stock exchange involves a criminal use of insider knowledge" (Goodfellow, 1999 ) that 14 per cent of the Australian economy is a shadow economy where each transaction involves multiple criminal offences to avoid company tax, payroll tax, personal income tax and obligations to take out workers compensation insurance (Schneider, and Enste, 1999) . We can't aspire to put 14 per cent or more of the Australian population in jail.
Some might say that we basically buy your argument there, but with some really serious matters like the safety of nuclear reactors, we must have zero tolerance. The evidence does not bear that out. Joe Rees (1994) research shows that over the last 20 years, some lessons of disasters like Three Mile Island have been learnt. The most important one is that you do not want operators to be rule-following automatons as a result of a tough regime of regulatory enforcement. You want them to be thinking systemically as team players about problem prevention, not about protecting their backside against a prosecution. After Three Mile Island, US nuclear safety regulation became more responsive, a more communitarian industry-wide approach to self regulation was adopted. Rees' empirical work also found a lot of reintegrative shaming within the industry, more than stigmatization when things went badly. Plants which had above average numbers of automatic shut-downs for safety reasons were treated with respect and helpfulness. This restorative approach to nuclear regulation sees SCRAMS (automatic shut-downs for safety reasons) today in the US industry running at one-tenth 5 the rate that they were at the time of Three Mile Island (see Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: Chapter 13 ).
Air safety is another example. One of the reasons the aircraft that brought you to this conference was so safe is that when pilots breach a safety rule they can report this in confidence without fear of prosecution. Their case becomes part of industry learning and is widely disseminated, but without their name attached to it.
But what about the most morally repugnant crimes of the powerful like genocide and other war crimes? Zero tolerance in this arena could be a policy guaranteed to deliver just deserts to the lieutenants in the Timor militias and impunity for the more malevolent criminals in Djakarta. Or consider the war crimes of World War II committed in that part of the world. As a matter of law, I happen to believe that Emperor Hirohito was criminally responsible for the death of my mother's two husbands, one who died in the Sandakan death march, the other who died many years later from illness classified as a result of it. It also seems clear today that at least one of the junior Japanese officers who did hang as a scapegoat for the death march was innocent. It has now been admitted that false testimony was adduced against him by Australian survivors; in one case a motivation for this may have been that the survivor survived because he was a collaborator with the Japanese. A policy of zero tolerance for serious war crimes would standardly see rough justice for the minnows, impunity for the sharks (on scapegoating see generally Fisse and Braithwaite, 1993) . Better to be principled about it, as I believe General MacArthur was in resisting the Australian government's pleas for the execution of Emperor Hirohito. In extending restorative justice to Hirohito, just as in the reintegration of Germany by the Marshall Plan and other acts of grace, the Americans showed a wisdom in building a peaceful Japan and Germany that the allies failed to show at Versailles.
Hence with every kind of organizational crime, especially the most dangerous and evil, zero tolerance is an irresponsible policy.
6

Naming and Shaming of Organizational Crime
If zero tolerance is a pie in the sky policy for dealing with the crimes of East Timor, is naming and shaming? Decidedly not. John Howard named the Indonesian military and General Wiranto. He even did something Australian Prime Ministers never do. He shamed President Clinton after his announcement that the US was cutting military ties to Indonesia: Howard pointed out that this would cost $700,000, that he was looking to the President to do more in terms of diplomatic and miliary support for a peacekeeping operation. In all of this naming and shaming, Howard was impeccably respectful as were Not all of the denunciation of Indonesia was in the respectful style these actors maintained. Stigmatizing modalities of shaming -verbal abuse, flag and effigy burningmaximize the risks of counterproductivity. Kay Pranis (1999: 9) has captured well what restorative justice advocates should regard as preferred practice here:
Traditional social justice activism often involves confrontational approaches to advancing social justice issues -naming and attacking social injustice. That approach is sometimes adversarial, involves emphasizing distance or "otherness" of those who hold different views, is often framed around abstract intellectual questions of rights, and may seek to achieve its agenda through power over opposing forces. Restorative justice includes concerns about social justice issues but relates to those issues in a different way. Restorative justice holds a vision of mutual responsibility for the welfare of everyone and uses personal narratives in a non-confrontational exchange to build from individual experiences to an understanding of broader social needs or harms.
While this is preferred restorative justice practice (and what should have happened in East Timor years ago), rights discourse that names responsible actors is needed when it fails, as it often will. Yet even when it does, we still need to heed Pranis's message about trying to avoid "otherness", seeking to persuade through non-confrontational exchange that communicates concern via narrative rather than moral categorization of the other.
To a degree any kind of naming and shaming is stigmatizing. That is why we have sensible policies about not conducting juvenile court proceedings in public or releasing the names of young offenders. Why is it wrong to name and shame them, but right to do so with BHP when it refuses to listen to concerns about polluting the Fly River? Why should we be against mug shots in the newspapers for street criminals, but in favour of this when it is the CEO of BHP? Why does it make sense to call a press conference as one of the outcomes of corporate crime restorative justice conferences, but not with conferences for common crimes? Nathan Harris's (1999) analysis of the RISE conferencing data shows that shaming by people the offender does not respect fails to induce shame. Indeed, the only shaming that induces shame is disapproval of the act by those who we respect very highly. Just respecting them a bit is not enough. So shaming by police, judges and mass publics who read newspapers is mostly beside the point. When we name and shame Bill Clinton for allowing slaughter of the innocents in East Timor, our target is Chelsea and the rest of his extended family, his secretary, his golfing buddy. The same targets as in a restorative justice conference. The difference is one of technique rather than substance. The need for it arises from certain realities of political and economic power. Presidents hire public relations professionals to render them invulnerable to shame. Their worst political enemies will regard their conduct as shameful no matter what they do. But the opinions of enemies are not at issue here. Chelsea's is. Most of the time, Chelsea is going to buy the cover story manufactured by the President's spin doctors and give her dad the benefit of the doubt. Most of the cut and thrust of politics will deliver very little shame from people whose respect the President deeply cares about.
Public but respectful naming and shaming is the best we can do with Presidents. It mostly will not work because politicians, like hardened criminals, are professionals at erecting shields to protect themselves from shame. When it does work, my hypothesis is 8 it works mostly through placing a story of human dimensions on the media that touches the heart of a Chelsea Clinton, that causes someone like her to say dad you must pay attention to this story. Again the psychological principles are the same as with the juvenile offender's conference. The nun's simple narrative of the suffering she saw as a result of the war crime has infinitely more power than saying shame on you for causing this crime. But the difference is that the juvenile offender does not have a PR person sitting beside her saying, "Yes it is terrible, but here is why there is nothing my President could have done to stop it." That is why public naming of a responsible person with political power (of the sort that Howard did with Clinton over East Timor) is often a moral imperative.
These arguments have even more power with the economic crimes of large corporations.
The empirical literature demonstrates that white-collar criminals have incredibly effective power in segregating audiences. In their business dealings, they have a ruthless, exploitative ethos, while at their church on Sunday the members of their congregation view them as a paragon of gentility. The other side of this is that white-collar criminals report the experience of great shame when this segregation of audiences breaks down as a result of a criminal conviction reported in the newspapers (see Benson's (1989) interviews with convicted white-collar criminals).
Powerful corporate players have the same PR experts by their side as Presidents and they enjoy much greater anonymity than Presidents when wrongdoing occurs. It is these realities of power that often make it necessary to push for a press conference for public corporate confession following a restorative justice conference. Piercing the corporate veil, getting the message through to the members of the CEO's congregation, is therefore the rationale for a variety of naming of shaming policies -from an environmental group publishing a list of the Dirty Dozen (the top 12 corporate polluters) to the Affirmative Action Agency naming companies in the parliament for failing to comply with their act.
There is typically a two-step process with corporate naming and shaming. The corporation is named, then internal compliance systems go to work to define personal 9 responsibility for putting things right. Again, Joe Rees (1994) work on nuclear safety and my own on coal mine safety (Braithwaite, 1985) shows how effective internal processes involve a corporate kind of reintegrative shaming. The plant or the mine with a poor accident record is displayed on a graph at a meeting of managers. The person in charge is asked to indicate what she is going to do to get her safety performance up to the level of other plants. Other managers tend to be nurturant, offering help to the shamed manager:
"There but for the grace of God go I", they think. So as Rees points out, the internal shaming by respected peers tends to be reintegrative. This is an important point. There are structural reasons why even external shaming of the corporation which is stigmatizing is likely to be transformed internally into reintegrative shaming within the community of corporate peers. The corporate veil is a device whose very purpose is to protect both the wealth and the dignity of the powerful men it shrouds.
While powerless common criminals do not have the structural benefit of a corporate veil, strong families can be a functional equivalent, transforming external stigmatization into a loving, reintegrative kind of internal disapproval. The trouble is that the worst juvenile offenders are those least likely to have such families; often their families amplify internally the stigmatizing messages from outside. Hence with common crime it is irresponsible to promote external stigmatization in the hope that it will be transformed into internal reintegration.
Of course there are other values at issue. One is accountability. The feminist will say that the adult responsible for sexual assault should be named in public because we need assurance that the criminal justice system does not operate to protect powerful men at the expense of children. Yet the restorative justice movement is helping us see that the way western criminal justice systems balance these values is flawed. Here there is much we can learn from Canadian First Nations feminists like Berma Bushdie (1999). She explains that in the remarkable accomplishments of Hollow Water in uncovering sexual abuse that afflicted the majority of children in that community, healing circles were at first confronting and private -for example "getting under the skin" of abusive men with help from other men who had already confessed who assist with piercing their pathetic rationalizations (Ross, 1996) . Only at the final stage is there a healing circle which is public to the whole community, at which attendances are very large. By this stage, there has been a lot of healing and forgiveness. Even many of the stoutest advocates of the victims, those who had earlier in the process been the most vigorous denouncers of the offender, by the stage of the final circle will be prepared to say positive things about how far the offender had come in owning responsibility for the evil he had done. The Cree wisdom here that our system lacks is to assure the community of public accountability for the agreements reached, but to defer the public accountability stage (often for years) until the prospects of a reintegrative public ceremony are at a maximum.
In summary, the simple fact is that when a child steals persistently, there is a good chance that this will eventually become known to her parents and/or teachers; she will not be able to escape their disapproval. When a senior company executive persistently pollutes, however, there is little prospect of her family finding out about this moral failure. In an unethical company she will even be shielded from disapproval of the moral failure by colleagues at work. Two-step processes of public naming and shaming of organizational responsibility and demanding individual responsibility from leaders is necessary. It is necessary in a way it is not with children because of a social structure of shame that leaves children vulnerable and elites invulnerable to effective disapproval.
PART II CASE STUDY: SHMING AND THE PREVENTION OF DRUG ABUSE
Now I will work through this analysis to show why it is plausible that public shaming is the key to preventing drug abuse. I am not thinking of public shaming in drug courts or any kind of standard individualistic criminological analysis of the durg abuser here. The starting point is a structural analysis of political and corporate power. Then this is combined with my standard analysis of the social structure of shame -that bank robbery is shameful while the corporate criminals of the finance sector suffer little shame in a world where every criminologist knows the best way to rob a bank is to own it.
Structural Analysis
How do we avert the standard criminological trap of precipitate methodological individualism with respect to drug abuse? If the analytic presciption is to do a structural analysis of power relationships first, what are the power relationships relevant to understanding drug abuse? Peter Drahos and I have sought to grapple with this task in Global Business Regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) , where a more detailed treatment can be found.
Mass drug addiction is a phenomenon of late modernity. It took at least 6,000 years of the poppy being known to be a "plant of joy", at least 4,000 years of international trade in Drugs of mass addiction this century become much bigger markets than therapeutic drugs, though prescription drugs also grow after World War II at a faster rate than any other product market. Mass addiction is a product of modernity and the globalizing qualities of modernity. Mass addiction requires that strong states offer protection to drug pushers for long enough to link organized production to distribution/marketing systems into new consumer markets. Britain was a strong state that protected the British East India Company while organized opium production was linked into the Chinese, Australian and other Asian markets. Germany protected its cocaine manufacturers as they were linked into new markets everywhere. Japan protected its heroin manufacturers and market, which sought to "unreasonably" restrict the indications for which they could be prescribed, which sought to mandate warnings to doctors and patients which were "unreasonably alarming", which sought to "unreasonably" regulate marketing practices by the pharmaceutical companies (Braithwaite, 1984) .
It tended not to matter if the state protection of the drug pushers were later lifted, as it eventually was in most of the cases listed above. McCoy's work shows how a sequence of protecting X against its enemies, then withdrawing X's protection, followed by protecting Y, then withdrawing Y's protection, then Z and withdrawal, can leave the world with an X, a Y and a Z all protected for long enough to become much more organized than other producers. The strong linkages into new markets are already secure by the time the state protection is lifted. Patent protection of "ethical" pharmaceuticals operates in much the same way. The state gives the patent holder a monopoly protected by the state. When it withdraws the protection upon expiry of the patent, the evidence is that the brand loyalty the old monopoly enjoys remains a barrier to competition (Slatter, 1977; Whitten, 1979; Bond and Lean, 1977) . The key difference is that the street-level pushing is done by sales representatives in suits who give out free samples, even opera tickets to doctors (instead of addicts who are given free drugs and money so long as they energized diet of proteins, glucose and caffeines could be used to stimulate the body artificially and make it maintain a constant level of performance through a long working day, then patent medicines could be used to sooth and relax it during the hours of rest. Patent medicine manufacturers produced drugs to assist every bodily function and to induce any desired state of mind. There were cocaine-based drugs to overcome fatigue, morphine remedies to soothe worn nerves, and heroin medications to calm the agitated mind or respiratory system (McCoy, 1980: 16) .
And then there was viagara.
What Defeated the First Wave of Mass Opiate Addiction?
A social movement against the opium trade emerged in the west. The Society for the Suppression of the Opium Trade was founded in 1874 and the Woman's Anti-Opium Urgency Committee at around the same time in England. It had interlocking membership with the temperance movement. In India campaigners simultaneously picketed liquor shops and opium dens as integral to the same social movement against drugs (Ghandi, 1952) . From 1893, Mahatma Ghandi had been a campaigner working with the Women's
Christian Temperance Union and other Christian and women's groups not only in India and South Africa, but also in other parts of Asia, such as Burma, against both the opium and alcohol trades (Ghandi, 1952) . Both social movements had enormous success in naming and shaming drug pushers and politicians who protected them and in persuading people to reject or moderate their use of drugs of addiction. The temperance movement, after decades of success in making drunkenness progressively more shameful, threw these gains into reverse through the error of successful compaigning for zero tolerance (prohibition) in the US.
The temperance movement in the English speaking world in the nineteenth century was huge in its following and many of its followers were progressives and radicals, preeminently most of the first wave feminists. It is important to note here, foreshadowing our conclusion, that it was "cool" to denounce the commercial exploitation of the liquor industry. estimated illicit production of opium at around 1,200 tons a year (Bruun, Pan and Rexed, 1975: 24) .
After the 1925 Geneva accord tightened controls and the League's Limitation Convention of 1931, legal heroin production dropped from 9,000 kilograms in 1926 to 1,000 five years later (McCoy, 1992: 268) . Again, we do not know to what extent this must be counterbalanced by a rise in illegal heroin production in the years before the depression.
Here we must be especially careful because rising regulation increased the comparative attraction of illicit demand for heroin over opium, because heroin is more concentrated and less bulky. Seizures of raw opium internationally peaked in 1936 at 124,497 kilos, falling to a low of 35,970 kilos in 1960 35,970 kilos in . Between 1936 35,970 kilos in and 1960 seizures fell from 18,063 to 672 kilos, heroin from 867 to 390, and cocaine from 70 to 10 kilos, notwithstanding improved international enforcement capabilities. This improved capability is reflected in the massive growth in cannabis seizures from 16,283 kilos in 1936 (before cannabis prohibition in most countries) to 875,849 in 1960 (Bruun, Pan and Rexed, 1975: 229) . In the United States, as in China, it seems that the peak of opiate addiction occurred "about the turn of the century, when the number [of addicts] probably was close to 250,000 in a population of 76 million, a rate so far never equalled or exceeded" (Musto, 1996:2) . Case of 1925 (Bruun, Pan and Rexed, 1975: 223-4) . Fifty years later we saw the same phenomenon, with 20 per cent of US amphetamine manufactures diverted to the illicit traffic (Bruun, Pan and Rexed, 1975: 236) .
In the 1960s, the possibility of drug trafficking becoming an organized activity that generated new demand was barely recognised, as reflected in the quaint optimism of a 1966 review of "Twenty Years of Narcotic Control Under the United Nations": "By now the problems have been clearly defined and some of them have been solved, or the instruments of their solution have been created: non-medical consumption of opium, coca leaf, cannabis, and of the drugs manufactured from them is outlawed in principle and is bound to disappear after transitional periods of adaptation" (Bruun, Pan and Rexed, 1975: 33) . Closure of shipping lanes during World War II greatly disrupted the organizing of drug trafficking, with merchant seamen important in the limited and disorganized trafficking in opiates that occurred during the 1940s.
Unfortunately US-led global enforcement policies increased the competitive advantages of more organized (networked), politically protected drug traffickers by crushing their less organized opposition. An additional important factor here was the way anticommunist insurgency movements learned that they could combine their capacity for systematic violence, their discipline, experience in money laundering and ability to call on the political protection of the US Central Intelligence Agency (and other intelligence agencies, such as that of Taiwan) to fund their military activities through the drug trade.
Scholars such as McCoy (1972 McCoy ( , 1980 have documented how the CIA supported a variety of anti-communist forces who relied on drug trafficking: Kuomintang insurgents against the Peoples' Republic of China from bases in the Golden Triangle, Burmese and Laotian drug lords during the period of Indo-Chinese instability from the 1950s to the 70s (Lintner, 1992; McCoy, 1992) , the Contras in Nicaragua (Block, 1992; Scott, 1992) , Miami and Tijuana Cubans (Kruger, 1980; Marshall, 1992; Scott, 1992 ) the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan and elements in the Pakistani military (Lifschultz, 1992) , and Noriega in Panama (Scott, 1992) . In Asia the result was that "By attacking heroin trafficking in the separate sectors of Asia's extended opium zone in isolation, the [US] Drug Enforcement Administration inadvertently diverted heroin exports from America to Europe and shifted opium production from South West Asia to Southeast Asia and back again-raising both global consumption and production with each move" (McCoy, 1992: 267) . For example, shutting down the export of Turkish production through Marseilles expanded opportunities for Golden Triangle traffickers protected by the CIA. Then when the postVietnam US turned its war on drugs against these very Golden Triangle producers, they responded by shifting their supply to Europe and Australia, which were then flooded with heroin dealers.
What the CIA did was protect new narcotic entrepreneurs from regulation for long enough for new production areas to be linked into the world market and new trafficking organizations to be established. Drug organizations are most vulnerable during the periods when these linkages are being established. Once these were organized, they continued to flourish after CIA protection was withdrawn, just as the Russian organized crime groups continued to flourish after KGB protection evaporated.
While mass alcohol addiction is the exception, appearing prior to organized capitalist trafficking and marketing of drugs under state protection, Australia is the exception to the exception. One important reason Australia became an extraordinarily heavy drinking society in the nineteenth century is that the NSW Corps became its first capitalists, trafficking rum under the protection of successive Governors.
Modernity and the Mobilizing of Disapproval
Our structural analysis of modernity is a pessimistic one: once misguided or corrupt states protect organized drug pushers for a period their marketing becomes established to the point where they do not need protection. Mass addiction disasters are therefore cumulative. But only to a degree, as the successful campaigns against opium, heroin, marijuana and cocaine until the 1960s and the successful campaign against alcohol for a century until the 1930s showed. Just as modernity delivered globalizing mass addiction, it also delivered globalizing social movement politics, with the anti-slavery, temperance and anti-opium movements being the first of these. Just as the contemporary women's and environmental movement have more important effects on crime than the criminal justice system (by rendering domestic violence and environmental crimes shameful) (Braithwaite, 1995) so did these early social movements have an enormous impact on drug use.
The message is that the most important thing we can do to prevent drug abuse is to stop new surges of state-protected marketing of addiction before the new markets they create are permanently established. Preventing cigarette manufacturers from moving on from marketing to boys to marketing to girls, from marketing in Australia to marketing in New Guinea. Preventing drug companies from persuading men they cannot live a full life without viagara. Have we ever accomplished that since the cocaine was taken out of Coke? Yes.
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Bex and Vincents (combining phenacetin, aspirin and a megadose of caffeine) was the most dangerous new addiction in Australia since tobacco. It was marketed particularly aggressively on radio and television during the 1950s to mothers as a pick-me-up to deal with the stresses of family life (Hennessy, 1993) . You cannot buy this drug in Australia today and there are no addicts left, though many ended their addiction through death.
Police peddling zero tolerance enforcement had nothing to do with this accomplishment.
The key actors were a social movement against the drug led by the Australian Kidney Foundation, certain specialist colleges of the medical profession, certain journalists who campaigned against the drug, and health regulators who eventually banned advertising and negotiated reintegratively with the manufacturers to withdraw the product from the market in a way that gave them time to diversity into safer drugs. In fact they were allowed to continue selling a safe formulation of Bex and Vincents, weaning many off their addiction without them realising it. But without the naming and shaming of the Women's Weekly, they never would have been brought to this responsible reaction. It was a noble moment in Australian history. Australia was the only nation in the world that had Bex and Vincents addiction. And it had the highest death rate in the world from kidney failure to prove it. The product's enormous commercial success was evidence of a global marketing opportunity that was voluntarily relinquished. Note in terms of our conclusion that the social movement against Bex and Vincents left my generation in the 60s thinking our parents' generation had been decidedly uncool to be swayed by advertising urging upon them "a cup of tea, a Bex and a good lie down" or to "take Vincents with confidence".
Another Australian innovation in social movement politics of which we can be proud according to this analysis is the Medical Lobby for Appropriate Marketing (MLAM).
This Adelaide-organized global network of medicos nips failures of supply-side regulation in the bud by the simple means of letter writing campaigns to pharmaceutical companies and regulators combined with the occasional press release. Along with the UN, the consumer movement and others, the evidence is that they are a useful strand in a web of controls against commercial marketing of new dangerous drugs (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: Chapter 15 ).
The drug abuse prevention strategy commended here has two elements. First, active social movement politics to denounce failure of state regulators to prevent highly organized linkage of drug marketing into new markets (from MLAM to grass roots campaigns against political corruption by the Mafia in Sicily to Transparency
International's more global work using institutions like the IMF and World Bank as weapons against corruption). Once supply linkages are disorganized rather than organized, there is good reason for hope that restorative justice in local communities, social investment in drug education and rehabilitation, can keep demand at low levels.
There are centuries of experience (millennia with opium) of community control and community help working to manage demand in the face of disorganized supply which is not allowed to market for identity-enhancement.
This experience gives us confidence that drug abuse can be kept under reasonable control with minimal police involvement. Organized criminal drug traffickers need to be given an incentive to shift their capital out of the shadow economy into the legal economy simultaneous with their markets being threatened by legal state supply to addicts. Licenced private supply of tobacco and alcohol could continue (subject to the kinds of regulatory checks docmented as effective in Homel's ( Homel et al., 1997) work), a total ban on any kind of marketing, gradually-expanding regulation of exposure to passive smoking and heavy taxation to fund education and rehabilitation. There is also every reason for confidence that this could reduce this kind of drug addiction, that drug abuse could become decidedly uncool if social movements against drug abuse could succeed in recruiting the kinds of cool people that the temperance movement recruited in the nineteenth century and the social movement against Bex and Vincents recruited in the 1960s.
Zero addiction would never be achieved, just as it never has been in the past. But then neither could zero tolerance achieve this. The error of zero tolerance seems transparent 22 in the disaster that was prohibition. The potential of naming and shaming seems evident in the demise of cocaine addiction after its removal from patent medicines at the turn of the century. It seems evident in the 1960s demise of Bex and Vincents addiction.
